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Most adults are married, plan for retirement with their spouse, and pool assets to a significant 
degree.  How then are each individual’s risk preferences combined in choosing the portfolio that 
represents for them the optimal tradeoff between risk and return?  There are two pathways 
through which marriage could amplify the expression of individual risk preferences at the 
household level.  First, if people choose spouses in part based on their appetite for risk, or 
another characteristic correlated with risk tolerance, then there could be polarization of 
household level risk preferences towards extremes.  Second, spouses may strategically adjust 
their decisions to compensate for their spouse’s preferences.  Is an only mildly risk averse person 
that is married to someone that is nearly risk neutral motivated to choose a very low risk low 
return asset allocation to compensate for their spouse’s risky behavior?  In this paper we explore 
the influence of marriage on the expression of individual risk preferences by examining both 
sorting in the marriage market and strategic decision making.  Using data from the Health and 
Retirement Survey we find a positive correlation between the risk preferences of spouses.  We 
also develop a theoretical model that determines optimal investment allocations conditional on 
own and spousal risk tolerance.  Optimal asset allocations from this model are compared to a 
naïve model that only includes own risk tolerance.  In related research the explanatory power of 
the naïve and spousal models are evaluated for prediction ability based on actual asset allocation 
decisions for couples using the HRS data.   
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By observing actual behavior and asking hypothetical questions, economists have learned 
a great deal about the distribution of individual risk preferences in various populations.  This has 
proven  useful  for  explaining  behavior  with  respect  to  savings,  consumption,  and  investing.  
However, most adults are married, plan for retirement with their spouse, and pool assets to a 
significant degree.  How then are each individual’s risk preferences combined in choosing the 
portfolio that represents for them the optimal tradeoff between risk and return?   
Economists have long recognized the complexities inherent to family life that complicate 
economic decision making beyond what is captured in traditional models that are based on a lone 
decision-maker  (Bergstrom,  1996;  Samuelson,  1956).    The  role  of  social  interactions  has 
received less attention than anonymous market interactions (Manski, 2000).  This trend has been 
reversed somewhat  with  the development  of fields  such as  noncooperative game theory and 
behavioral economics.  As with nearly all economic research on families, the literature on intra-
household dynamics begins with Becker (see Becker 1991 for a review), whose approach was to 
model households as if they were unitary agents with a single complete set of preferences and 
beliefs.    This  has  given  way  to  non-unitary  models  that  explicitly  account  for  the  fact  that 
multiple  individuals  with  heterogeneous  preferences,  incentives,  and  influence  constitute  a 
household.  More recent research has begun to examine the role of private information  and 
limited communication, and also to try and explain why household allocations have been found 
to not be Pareto optimal or efficient (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; 
Lundberg  and  Pollack,  1994;  Chiappori,  1992;  Browning  and  Chiappori,  1998).    To  our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to look specifically at risk preferences and retirement planning 
considering both partner selection and intra-household strategic decision making.    
There  are  two  pathways  through  which  marriage  could  distort  the  expression  of 
individual risk preferences; sorting and strategic behavior.  Sorting is the process through which 
people select partners.  The question is, do “likes marry likes”, do “opposites attract”, or neither?   
Spivey (2010) finds that more risk averse people tend to get married when they are younger.  
Given that people tend to marry someone of a similar age there is reason to believe that there 
would  be  positive  correlation  in  spouses’  risk  preferences.    Strategic  behavior  refers  to  the 3 
 
process through which spouses influence each others’ decisions.  This includes both indirect and 
direct influence.  By indirect we mean the process of one person adjusting their behavior to 
account  for what they believe their spouse decides to do.  This has  a direct  game theoretic 
formulation.  Direct influence refers to one spouse actively seeking to persuade or bargain with 
their spouse.  Direct influence could involve differences in household roles particularly based on 
occupational differences which are often correlated with gender.  While the movement of women 
into  the  labor  force  has  reduced  differences  in  marriage  roles  based  on  gender,  significant 
differences in wages and employment remain.  Research has also found systematic differences in 
risk preferences between men and women.  Even when controlling for income, women have been 
found to be systematically more risk averse than men (Neelakantan, 2010).   
In  order  to  empirically  measure  how  individual  preferences  are  combined  into  total 
household investment decisions it is necessary to account for both sorting and strategic behavior.  
We use data from the Health and Retirement Survey that provides a measure of individual risk 
preferences for both spouses using income gamble questions.  This allows us to measure whether 
people tend to marry someone with similar risk preferences.  While it would be useful to have 
data  on  risk  preferences  prior  to  marriage  previous  research  has  shown  that  people  tend  to 
change little even in response to dramatic life events (Sahm, 2007).  Therefore, the existence of a 
relationship between spousal preferences is likely a result of selection rather than a convergence 
in spousal preferences over time.   
We  do  find  positive  correlation  between  the  risk  preferences  of  spouses.    Strategic  
models predict this would be the case because it reduces conflict that results when preferences 
are different.  We also analyze stock holdings in hypothetical individual accounts under different 
circumstances – when own utilities as functions of own wealth are maximized and when own 
utilities as functions of total household wealth are maximized.   
   
 
Review of Relevant Literature 
 
Models of intra-household bargaining are either unitary (Becker, 1991) or non-unitary.  
Unitary models assume that households maximize a single objective function according to a 4 
 
single set of preferences, beliefs, and information.  Non-unitary models permit each individual to 
have  their  own  preferences  so  that  the  problem  is  to  maximize  a  weighted  sum  of  utility 
functions.  Bergstrom (1996) provides a survey of early work modeling household decisions as 
the outcome of a collective process.  Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), 
and Lundberg and Pollack (1993) lay the groundwork for non-unitary models of households and 
use  Nash  cooperative  bargaining  models.    Core  aspects  of  these  papers  that  have  proven 
problematic are the assumptions that commitments are binding, there is full information, agents 
are able to communicate completely, and that outcomes are Pareto optimal.  Udry (1996), Jones 
(1986), Duflo and Udry (2004), and Rangel (2006) all find at least some evidence that outcomes 
are not efficient.  The use of cooperative models also proved to be problematic, in large part 
because they used different  threat  points,  divorce versus  a noncooperative marriage, but  the 
theory  provided  no  basis  for  choosing  between  them.    Alternatively,  noncooperative  theory 
arrives  at  the  appealing  conclusion  that  extreme  outside  options,  such  as  divorce,  are  not 
legitimate threat points in day to day disagreements (Rubenstein, 1982; Binmore, 1985).  As long 
as there are gains from a marriage that are shared in such a way that both people are better off 
than if they were divorced the divorce threat is not credible (Bergstrom, 1996).  Because of this, 
and  other  beneficial  qualities,  intra-household  bargaining  models  have  come  to  rely  on 
noncooperative theory.    
Intra-household bargaining models have been applied to a range of household decisions.  
Browning and Chiappori (1999) look at  demand and expenditures and ask whether previous 
research that has found neoclassical demand theory to be violated in practice have incorrectly 
attributed this result to problems with the theory.  Instead, they posit that the problem lies with 
assuming households can be treated as representative individuals.  Their hypothesis is supported 
by the finding that violations persist with two-person households but not one-person households.  
The effect of private information on household decision making has received attention recently, 
particularly  in  developing  country  contexts  where  spouses  often  migrate  great  distances  for 
work.  Chen finds that the wives of husbands that migrate seek to conceal resource allocation 
decisions  from  their  husbands  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with  the  wife  having  increased 
bargaining  power,  suggesting  a  non-cooperative  model  of  households.    Ashraf  (2009) 
investigates how varying information asymmetries and communication between spouses affects 5 
 
the extent to which someone shares resources with their spouse.  Duflo and Udry (2004) use 
income shocks to one spouse as a tool for identifying individual preferences within households.  
Ligon (2002) develops a more complex dynamic bargaining model.   
Models of spousal choice take the form of search models where an individual compares 
potential spouses based on a vector of desirable traits.  While there are many people in the world 
that have little control over who and when they marry, the marriage sorting process is largely self 
determined  in  the  U.S.,  which  is  the  focus  of  this  paper.    The  seminal  papers  on  marriage 
markets are Gale and Shapley (1962), Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), and Becker (1991).  
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) provide a survey.  It is important to note that results from marriage 
market  models  depend  on  assumptions  made  about  bargaining.    Each  person  makes  an 
assessment of what their utility would be if they were to marry someone at a particular point in 
time.  This option is then weighed against marrying someone else, as well as their utility if they 
remained single.   
Spivey (2010) provides the most detailed examination of the extent to which risk plays a 
part in selecting for a spouse.  The model used in the study proposes that the more risk averse 
someone is the lower is their reservation quality, so they are likely to find someone that is 
acceptable faster.  It is also argued that risk aversion makes one more eager to get married so that 
they can pool resources and share risk with someone.  Both of these points are supported by 
empirical  analysis  that  shows  more  risk  averse  people  getting  married  at  a  younger  age.  
However, this is not consistent across genders.  Risk attitudes do a better job of explaining when 
men get married.  Another implication of the model that is borne out by the data is that more risk 
averse men will have spouses with less desirable qualities.   
The recent explosion in studies in the behavioral economics literature on group decision 
making has produced a number of findings that are relevant to our research question.  This strand 
of research generally focuses on identifying how groups influence the expression of individual 
preferences under a range of situations reflecting authority, rules, and preferences.  A majority of 
papers in this area have relied on laboratory experiments to test in a very controlled setting how 
groups  perform  relative  to  individuals,  what  processes  are  most  important  in  understanding 
group dynamics, and how group formation and functioning affects results.    Cason and Mui 
(1998) report the first study on groups in economics that is based largely on concepts developed 6 
 
in  social  psychology.    This  study  and  subsequent  ones  have  significantly  improved 
understanding of how group behavior differs from individual behavior both in terms of cognitive 
tasks (Cooper and Kagel, 2005) and in preference based decisions (e.g., Sutter, 2009).  Similar to 
the intra-household bargaining literature, research on groups was motivated by the recognition 
that decisions in a wide array of economic contexts are the result of a collective process.  With 
respect  to  risk,  Charness,  Karni,  and  Levin  (2007)  found  groups  to  act  in  accordance  with 
monotonicity in terms of first-order stochastic dominance and Bayesian updating.   
 
 
Model and Results 
 
  We start with a 2-person 2-period model where each individual chooses how to allocate a 
fixed amount of wealth between risky and riskless assets.  This ignores a number of other factors 
such as income, consumption, and savings decisions that are influenced by infinitely repeated 
decisions with a strong intertemporal nature.  These factors are interesting and important but the 
simple asset allocation decision alone is still rich enough to capture the fundamental question 
posed in this paper.   
Each person has an initial wealth that can be invested in either a risky or risk-free asset 
where the proportion in the risky asset is denoted by s  which earns a return  s r which is a random 
variable.  The amount in the riskless asset is    1 sW     which earns a return  b r which is known 
with  certainty.  The  essential  assumption  that  makes  the  problem  interesting  is  that  wealth 
following the realization of the return on investment is shared equally by both people in the 
household.  This follows intuitively from the fact that the goods that are the largest household 
expenditures  have  public  goods  characteristics  within  the  household,  such  as  houses  and 
vacations.   
  Each  individual’s decision  is  to allocate their  wealth between the  risky  and  risk-free 
assets where their utility is based on total wealth of both spouses.  7 
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The spouses must simultaneously decide how much of their own wealth to allocate towards the 
risky  asset  and  how  much  to  put  in  the  riskless  asset.    It  is  assumed  that  they  have  full 
information on their spouse’s risk preferences but not on their allocation due to the simultaneity.   
Data  from  the  Health  and  Retirement  Study  (HRS)  surveys  are  used.    The  biennial 
surveys that started in 1992 are fielded to a nationally representative sample of older Americans.  
Particularly, data from 1992, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006 surveys are used as hypothetical 
income  gamble  questions  were  fielded  in  these  years.  For  the  purposes  of  this  study  only 
married couples are considered, resulting in a sample size of 7,094.     
The  hypothetical  income  gamble  questions,  that  elicit  risk  attitudes,  asked  the 
respondents  to  compare  two  hypothetical  job  scenarios  and  to  choose  between  a  job  that 
guarantees present family income and a job that offers higher income but also carries the risk of 
losing income.  The exact wording of the question was as follows: 
Suppose  that  you  are  the  only  income  earner  in  the  family.  Your  doctor 
recommends that you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between 
two possible jobs. The first would guarantee your current total family income for 
life. The second is possibly better paying, but the income is also less certain.  
There is a 50–50 chance the second job would double your total lifetime income 
and a 50–50 chance that it would cut it by a third. Which job would you take – the 
first job or the second job? 
If the respondent chose the riskier option, then the same scenario was repeated but with higher 
risks.  Similarly, if the respondent chose the guaranteed income, then the same scenario with less 
risky odds was presented.  These questions resulted in grouping respondents in the following 
four levels of income risk aversion, listed from least to most risk-averse.  The respondent would: 
1.  take a job with even chances of doubling income or cutting income by 50%, 
2.  take a job with even chances of doubling income or cutting income by a third, 
3.  take a job with even chances of doubling income or cutting income by 20%, or 8 
 
4.  take the job that guarantees current income given any of the above alternatives. 
In Table 1 we present the distribution of spouses’ risk aversion.  The Pearson’s chi-square test-
statistic is 188.38 (p-value = 0.00) indicating that a null hypothesis of independence of risk 
aversion between the spouses may be rejected.   Moreover, we conclude from  a Wilcoxon’s 
signed-rank test that husbands are significantly less risk averse than their respective wives.  In 
other words, from the survey data we find that like marry likes.     
[Table 1 here] 
Following Barsky et al. (1997) and Kimball et al. (2008), we assume that risk tolerance or 
the  inverse  of  risk  aversion  is  lognormally  distributed  and  that  individuals  have  objective 
functions with constant relative risk aversion.  Thus,  
(1)   
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where   is the relative risk aversion parameter, and the utility function for each individual with 













Using  expected  utility  theory  and  CRRA  utility  functional  form,  Barsky  et  al.  (1997)  and 
Kimball et al. (2008) find that an individual accepts the risky job with downside risk   if 
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  of  relative  risk  tolerance 
corresponding to the four categories of the income gamble questions, from least risk averse to 
most risk averse, are (0,0.27), (0.27,0.50), (0.50, 1), and (1,  ).  As in the above mentioned 
studies, we assume that the variance of the observed log relative risk tolerance distribution is the 
sum of the variance of the true log relative risk tolerance and the variance of the random noise.  
In other words, 
(4) 
2 2 2
true error      
Repeated responses to  the income  gamble questions  from  at  least  a subsample allows us  to 
estimate 
2   and 
2
true  .  The parameter estimates   , 
2   and 
2
true   whether computed separately 9 
 
for  husbands  and  wives  or  jointly  as  log  risk  tolerance  parameter  estimates  of  couples 
(distributed as bivariate normal) are quite similar.  However, the latter allows us to calculate and 
test the significance of the correlation between a pair’s estimated risk tolerances.  We estimate 
that  1.751 husband   ,  1.640 husband   ,  , 0.900 true husband   ,    1.910 wife   ,  1.490 wife   ,  and 
, 0.756 true wife   .  The correlation between husbands’ and wives’ risk aversion is estimated to be 
0.182.  Standard errors of all parameter estimates are small (between 0.02 and 0.04).   
  We convert the log relative risk tolerance estimates into relative risk aversion values by 
calculating the expected value of relative risk aversion conditional on the category of the income 
gamble response as 
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Using the parameter estimates,    | Ek   has four values – 3.58, 5.05, 6.12 and 11.07 for the 
husbands, and four values – 4.31, 5.63, 6.64 and 10.73 for the wives.   
Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) show that a household chooses its stock    S  and 
bond   B  holdings such that in each time period it solves the maximization problem 
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where  s r  is a stochastic return to risky assets,  b r  is a fixed return to risk-free assets,  t W  is the 
wealth in time period t and  0 W  is the initial wealth of the household.  For estimation purposes, 
we assume that  b r  is 1% and  s r  is either 23%, 14% or −13% with equal probability and is 10 
 
independent over time.  This yields a mean return of 8% with standard deviation of 18.73%, 
which is similar to the S&P 500 for 1871-2006.  Using this setup and a CRRA utility function, 
Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) find that it is optimal for a household to invest a constant 
share of wealthsin the risky assets in every time period that solves 
(8)           1 1 1 0 s b s b E r s r s r r
 
         
Replacing   in equation (8) by    | Ek   as calculated in equation (5), we can numerically solve 
s for the household.  However, in our study each household consists of a husband and wife.  
Thus, we compute  s in three distinct ways.  First, we average the     | Ek   values of husband 
and wife in each household and solve  s.  Next, we assume that couples do not interact and 
optimize their risky asset allocations independently.  In other words, each individual maximizes 
own utility and obtain optimal  husband s  and  wife s .  Lastly, we assume that couples do interact and 
optimize  husband s  and  wife s  in such a way that they maximize individual utilities as functions of 
total household wealth.   
  Consider a simple 2-period model of a household consisting of a husband and a wife.  
Each individual starts with an initial wealth  0 W , such that the total household wealth is  0 2W .  
Each individual also owns an account and decides a mix of stock and bond holdings.  However, 
both individual maximize total household utility, instead of own utilities.  Denote wife’s share of 








S s W   .  Then wife’s maximization problem is 
(9) 
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And husband’s maximization problem is 
(10) 
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In the numerical analysis,  w   in equation (9) is replaced by    | w Ek   and  h   in equation (10) is 
replaced by    | h Ek   as calculated from equation (5).  Each spouse is aware of the other’s level 
of risk aversion and first calculates   ,   , i E s i w h   by maximizing the other’s individual utility, 
and  then  equations  (9)  and  (10)  are  solved  simultaneously.    Constraints  as  in  (7)  apply.  
Additionally, we do not allow any lending or borrowing and restrict  i s  between 0 and 1.  In 
Table 2 we present the solutions to the three situations.  In column (1) the optimal risky asset 
allocation corresponds to the situation where spouses first average their risk aversion levels, and 
they then maximize household utility as a single entity.  In columns (2) and (3) the optimal risky 
asset allocations correspond to husbands and wives where each spouse maximizes own utility 
independent of the other.  In columns (4) and (5) the optimal risky asset allocations correspond 
to husbands and wives where each spouse maximizes total household utility.            
[Table 2 here] 
As expected, stock holdings decrease with increase in levels of risk aversion.  However, 
we find evidence of polarization.  If a husband is less risk averse than his wife then he holds 
larger share of risky assets  under total  household  utility maximization compared to  what  he 
would  have  held  if  he  maximized  his  own  utility  independently  from  his  wife’s  utility.  
Similarly,  the  wife  holds  lesser  risky  assets  compared  to  what  she  would  have  held  if  she 





Our objective in this paper is to develop a theoretical model of individual investment 
behavior that accounts for the fact that most adults are married and pool assets with their spouse.  
The goal is to develop a model that more accurately predicts observed investment decisions for 
married  individuals.    First,  based  on  data  from  the  2006  HRS  survey,  we  find  significant 
evidence of correlation between the risk preferences of spouses.  In other words, likes marry 
likes.  This could be evidence that either people choose spouses based on risk preferences, or that 
they choose a spouse based on another characteristic that is correlated with risk preferences.  We 12 
 
then proceed to develop a theoretical model that we use to numerically solve for the optimal 
asset  allocation  conditional  on  one’s  own  risk  preferences  and  the  spouse’s  risk  preference.  
Results from simulations are discussed.  In future work we will evaluate the predictive power of 
this model to a naïve model that predicts investment allocations based only on individuals’ own 






Ashraf, N. (2009). Spousal control and intra-household decision making: An experimental study 
in the Philippines. American Economic Review, 99(4):1245-1277.   
Barsky, R.B., Juster, F.T., Kimball, M.S., and Shapiro, M.D. (1997). Preference parameters and 
behavioral heterogeneity: An experimental approach in the Health and Retirement 
Study. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2):537-579. 
Becker, G. A treatise on the family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press, 1991.  
Bergstrom T. (1996). Economics in a family way. Journal of Economic Literature, 34(4):1903-
1934.  
Binmore, K. (1985). Bargaining and coalitions, In: Game-theoretic models of bargaining, Ed: 
Alvin Roth. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1985, pp. 259-304.   
Browning, M., and Chiappori, P. (1998). Efficient intra-household allocations: a general 
characterization and empirical tests. Econometrica, 66(6):1241-1278.   
Cason, T., and Mui, V. (1997). A laboratory study of group polarisation in the team dictator 
game. The Economic Journal 107:1465-1483.  
Charness, G., Karni, E., and Levin, D. (2007). Individual and group decision making under risk: 
An experimental study  of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic 
dominance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 35:129-148.  
Chen, J. Identifying non-cooperative behavior among spouses: Child outcomes in migrant-
sending households. Working Paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=964212.  
Chiappori, P. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. Journal of Political Economy, 
100:437-467.  
Cooper, D., and Kagel J. (2005). Are two heads better than one? team versus individual play in 
signaling games. American Economic Review, 95(3):477-509.  
Duflo, E., and Udry, C. (2004). Intrahousehold resource allocation in the Cote D’Ivoire: Social 
norms, separate accounts and consumption choices. National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 10498.   
Gale, D., and Shapley, L. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. American 
Mathematical Monthly, 69:1-15.  
Jagannathan, R., and Kocherlakota, N.R. (1996). Why should older people invest less in stocks 
than younger people? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 20(3): 
11-23. 
Jones, C. (1986). Intrahousehold bargaining in response to the introduction of new crops: A case 
study from North Cameroon. In: Understanding Africa’s Rural Households and 
Farming Systems, ed. Joyce Lewinger Mook. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Kimball, M. S., C. R. Sahm, and M. D. Shapiro. (2008). Imputing risk tolerance from survey 
responses. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 103(483): 1028-1038.  14 
 
Koopmans, T., and Beckman, M. (1957). Assignment problems and the location of economic 
activities. Econometrica, 25(1):53-76.   
Ligon, E. (2002). Dynamic bargaining in households. Giannini Foundation Working Paper.   
Lundberg, S., and Pollack, R. (1994). Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market. 
Journal of Political Economy, 101(6):998-1010.   
Manser, M., and Brown, M. (1980). Marriage and household decision making: A bargaining 
analysis. International Economic Review, 21:31-44.  
Manski, C. (2000). Economic analysis of social interactions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
14(3):115-136.  
McElroy, M., and Horney, M. (1981). Nash bargained household decisions: Toward a 
generalization of the theory of demand. International Economic Review, 22:333-349.  
Neelakantan, U. (2010). Estimation and impact of gender differences in risk tolerance. Economic 
Inquiry, 48(1): 228-233. 
Rangel, M. (2006). Alimony rights and intrahousehold allocation of resources: Evidence from 
Brazil. Economic Journal, 116(513):627-58.  
Roth, A., and Sotomayor, M. (1990). Two-sided matching. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.   
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50(1):97-109.  
Samuelson, P. (1956). Social indifference curves. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1):1-22.  
Sahm, C. R. (2007). How much does risk tolerance change? Washington: Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics Discussion Series  no. 66, 2007. 
Spivey, C. (2010). Desperation or desire? The role of risk aversion in marriage. Economic 
Inquiry, 48(2):499-516.  
Sutter, M. (2009). Individual behavior and group membership: Comment. American Economic 
Review (in press).   
Udry, C. (1996). Gender, agricultural production and the theory of the household. Journal of 





Table 1:  Distribution of spouses’ risk aversion 
Risk aversion 
1 = least risk averse 
4 = most risk averse   Wife  Total 
Husband  1  2  3  4   
1  178  116  132  586  1012 
2  83  126  121  426  756 
3  109  103  201  555  968 
4  390  367  545  3056  4358 
Total  760  712  999  4623  7094 
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Table 2:  Optimal share of risky assets 
Risk aversion 
1 = least risk averse 








    Husband (H)  Wife (W)  Husband (H)  Wife (W) 
           
H=1, W=1  0.73  0.81  0.67  0.95  0.53 
H=1, W=2  0.63  0.81  0.51  1.00  0.22 
H=1, W=3  0.56  0.81  0.43  1.00  0.06 
H=1, W=4  0.40  0.81  0.27  1.00  0.00 
H=2, W=1  0.62  0.57  0.67  0.47  0.77 
H=2, W=2  0.54  0.57  0.51  0.63  0.45 
H=2, W=3  0.49  0.57  0.43  0.71  0.30 
H=2, W=4  0.36  0.57  0.27  0.88  0.00 
H=3, W=1  0.55  0.47  0.67  0.27  0.87 
H=3, W=2  0.49  0.47  0.51  0.43  0.55 
H=3, W=3  0.45  0.47  0.43  0.51  0.40 
H=3, W=4  0.34  0.47  0.27  0.67  0.06 
H=4, W=1  0.37  0.26  0.67  0.00  1.00 
H=4, W=2  0.34  0.26  0.51  0.01  0.76 
H=4, W=3  0.32  0.26  0.43  0.08  0.61 
H=4, W=4  0.26  0.26  0.27  0.25  0.28 
 
 
 